This paper investigates relations between convexity of the underlying game and the two communication games. In particular, assuming the underlying game to be convex, necessary and sufficient conditions on the conmmnication graph are provided such that the communication games are convex. Moreover, under the same conditions, it is shown that the Myerson value and the position value are in the core of the point game. Some remarks are made on superadditivity and balancedness.
Introduction
In this paper we consider cooperative games with communication restrictions. We assume that the communication possibilities are modelled by means of a communication graph in which the points are the players and the arcs correspond to pairs of players who can communicate directly.
These so-called communication situations were first studied by Myerson (1977) .
He introduced corresponding point games and provided and axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value of these games. Alternatively, Borm, Owen and Tijs (1990) introduced arc games and the position value. This value could be characterized axiomatically in case the communication graph contains no cycles.
The present paper investigates under what conditions on the communication graphs nice properties of the underlying game are inherited by the point game and the arc game. The main result of this paper can be found in section 3: if a communication graph is cycle-complete (cycle-free) and the underlying game is convex, then the corresponding point game (arc game) is convex and the Myerson value (position value) is in the core of the point game. The paper concludes with some remarks on the inheritance of superadditivity and balancedness in section 4. First we recall the main definitions concerning communication situations in section 2. 
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